Russia: Other Points of View

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

PUTIN'S DISAPPEARANCE. Western media outlets, governments and “experts” beclown themselves. Again.

CRIMEA, THE WAY HOME. Крым Путь на Родину. Here it is with English subtitles. Watch it: Korsun showed Crimeans what was coming, Berkut provided a seed crystal for self-defence and taught them how to recognise and suppress a “spontaneous” demo (go to 41).

WESTERN VALUES™ PART 1. Andrei Babitsky, once a certified hero journalist speaking truth to Putin, has been fired. It's not enough to be 99% anti-Putin, it must be 100% all the time. Read this.

NEMTSOV MURDER. Remember that? The investigators stick to their story: Dadayev did kill him; ordered by Adam Osmayev, commander of Jokhar Dudayev Battalion in Kiev forces, to embarrass Putin. This raises the possibility that the Charlie Hebdo connection was just the hook to get Dadayev to do it.

SNOWDEN. The German Vice Chancellor says Washington threatened to cease sharing intelligence if Berlin offered him asylum or allowed him to travel there. Deduction: if Germany was threatened, so was everyone else. We know that the Bolivian President's plane was forced down (so much for Obama's promise). Evidently, a lot of pressure was applied. One country refused to knuckle under. What do you suppose that has to do with current events?

RUSSIAN ECONOMY. Piece here from a rational observer. Not too bad but wait and see. Another agreeing.

QUOTE OF THE YEAR. The German Foreign Minister told US Secretary of State John Kerry “it’s far too early to pat our shoulders and take pride in what we have achieved” in Ukraine. Thousands dead and maimed, immense property damage, economic ruin, oligarch wars, neo-nazis, war talk. Much too early.

WESTERN VALUES™ PART 2. Turns out that the Clinton Foundation got lots of money from a Ukrainian oligarch. No effect on policy of course.

MINSK II. Kiev has broken it. Item 4 called for “a dialogue” “on modalities of conducting local elections”. Instead the Ukraine parliament passed a law saying that elections can only begin after the areas are returned to Kiev's control. No dialogue there. By the way, read the agreement: Moscow is required to do nothing, Kiev much. So when the WMSM tells you Moscow has broken it, as it will, ask yourself what part of the agreement it's broken. A resumption of war is likely, and the end result will be the same. But this time, I expect Moscow to really intervene (why bother with another agreement Kiev won't keep?) And, when it does, there will be no need for blurry satellite photos and reporters who forgot their smart phones. But, should the oligarch war get violent – see below – there will be no requirement.

OLIGARCH WARS. Have started. Still very murky but here is what we know. Ihor Kolomoysky is someone your media outlets have not told you much about: an oligarch, funder of many private armed formations, suspected of many atrocities (MH-17 shootdown?), he was appointed Governor of Dnepropetrovsk in the new oligarch-free European-style Ukraine and hailed as a patriot by the ever-accommodating WMSM. Parliament passed a law that would have reduced his control of certain oil companies. He sent armed men to take over two head offices. Poroshenko said no more private military organisations would be tolerated. Yesterday he dismissed him as Governor of Dnepropetrovsk. Not over yet; in theory Kolomoysky has a lot of armed forces that answer to him. WMSM and State Department spin will be entertaining to watch.

“DRAGOON RIDE”. The brainchild of the excitable General Hodges, a US army column will travel through several east European countries: “to assure those allies that live closest to the Bear that we are here”. Ludicrous: a cavalry squadron, an insignificant light force, will probably only make people nervous. There should be some amusement as it proceeds through the Czech Republic: the locals have been warned not to throw vegetables at it and the Czech Army will escort it. Moscow will only be more contemptuous. And that's assuming there are no embarrassing breakdowns, lapses in discipline, traffic accidents, protests etc.

“PUTIN'S INFORMATION WAR”. No wonder the West is having trouble selling its story: “The product they’re selling is not very attractive overseas”. “if you're going to say someone is a poisonous liar who traffics in conspiracy theories, then you should show that. That the Post doesn't seem to feel the need to do so either means the evidence isn't there, or that the burden of proof is very low when it comes to official enemies”. Western governments wouldn't be whining unless they knew their story was failing.

Is Nemtsov’s Murder a Replay of Kirov’s?

by Jack Matlock

www.jackmatlock.com

Responding to the shock of the gang-style execution of Nemtsov in Moscow, Duma Deputy Ilya Ponomarev, speaking at Tufts University yesterday, said that it reminded him of the Kirov assassination, and predicted that the effect on Russian politics might be of comparable magnitude. I did not have the opportunity to question him directly about what precisely he had in mind, but I gathered from his other remarks that he believes the crime was prompted by a struggle for power within the Putin regime. After all, Stalin used the Kirov murder to launch the infamous purges that reached their height in the trials of 1938 and is widely suspected of having arranged the murder himself.

Russian politics for some time has resembled the proverbial dog fight under a rug, despite the image promoted by the regime of a seamless and efficient “vertical of power.” In some important respects, the killing of Nemtsov does not resemble the killing of Kirov. Kirov was one of Stalin’s closest associates and, in effect, his viceroy in Leningrad. Nemtsov was, on the other hand, a prominent and active oppositionist. A direct point-by-point comparison of the two murders would be absurd. Vladimir Putin does not need to arrange the murder of a prominent oppositionist in order to purge elements he considers unreliable in his own government.

Many persons at the Tufts symposium assumed, upon hearing the shocking news, that Putin himself ordered the assassination and did so as a stern warning to other would-be oppositionists. This was a natural reaction for anyone who assumes that Putin exercises the sort of total control of Russia that Stalin once did of the Soviet Union. It identifies a motivation that cannot be dismissed out of hand.

NEMTSOV'S MURDER

Friends,  

I want to get a note out to you as the publicity mounts over the Boris Nemtsov murder.

Secondly, none of us have any idea who ordered or carried out the killing of Nemtsov––and we may never know.

We do know that America's mainstream media will construe this as a murder instigated by Vladimir Putin.

I will give you my thoughts on Nemtsov and this tragic happening.

I've watched Boris Nemtsov since he first came on the scene as a seemingly "brilliant" young Governor from Nizhny Novgorod Oblast in the early 1990s.  He came to Moscow where he tried his hand at various posts and activities surrounding the Yeltsin government and was one of the many Vice Premiers.  At that time numbers of active young Russian men (and a few women) were vying for the different new positions that were opening up in Moscow.  The competition was fierce and the movement was constant.

I had such high hope for Nemtsov!  He was very verbal, always out in front founding one organization or another.  After a while it became clear to me that Nemtsov could be a good front person, but he couldn't seem to come up with rational, organized proposals for bringing the New Russia into some semblance of order and stability.  In the 1990s both were imperative.  Russia was a wild, uncontrolled, increasingly criminal place following the implosion of the USSR.  Old laws were gone, new laws were yet to be written, the ruble was worthless, corruption was rampant,  murders were occurring daily.  Russian people were forced to survive on bartering of anything they had, that someone else might want.  The country was in dire straits and the situation begged for solutions -- or proposals for how to survive this mass chaos, lawlessness and criminality. 

Nemtsov was always out in front making speeches, getting attention, but short on planning or solution making.  Many of us realized this and scanned the scene looking for other young personalities who might be sufficiently organized to get Russia moving beyond its deep mire before it collapsed and fragmented.  

It seemed to me from there on, Nemtsov was passed over, yet he was still around making himself known. He gravitated toward becoming an opposition voice where he remained until his demise, I supposed due to the fact that was the only role open for him.

I always thought of him as having an excellent"out there" personality, but not enough instinctive skills to meet Russia's need at the time––and it was unfortunate that he became somewhat of a "poor loser", criticizing others who had gone on beyond him.  However, this was true of quite a few Russians who floated around the periphery at that time.  It seems this is not uncommon for people who have extrovert personalities, loud voices and large aspirations, yet don't have the well-honed instincts to move up the ladders to positions for which they yearn. 

Would Putin have wanted Nemtsov dead?

ABSOLUTELY NOT!

He would have done anything possible to prevent  it -- along with the sordid accusations that invariably will come from the West.

Nemtsov was a nobody to Putin and the Russian population.

Anything he complained of had been complained about by others over and over -- it was old stuff. 

Information about corruption around Sochi events?  The pros/cons on this are old and well rehearsed by many.

Stopping the demonstration in Moscow?  It was to be tiny -- why would Putin be interested in this?

In my opinion, Nemtsov's murder was either some unknown personal vendetta, a business deal gone sour or perhaps something surrounding the 20-year-old he was with ….

…. but more likely this murder contract was carried out to create more negative publicity with which to demonize Putin. 

So let's watch how it plays out.  

All the best,  Sharon

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

SYRIA. So, thanks to Putin, the US is not, as we speak, bombing away in a dubious cause to the benefit of its enemies. Having read a great deal of the commentary I am struck with the gulf between America’s opinioneers and its citizens. For example, compare this incoherent anti-Putin rant with the more considered comments of its readers. I have seen this almost universally: lots of Americans understand that they would be in another war if not for Putin. However, there remains a considerable pack of people who really, really want to go to war in Syria: here is a Canadian.

PUTINOPHILIA. A side effect of the Syria crisis is an admiration for Putin in the USA. This piece sums up some of it; another; different subject; this one suggests an interesting theory for all his macho activity. More examples at Russia Debate. A lot of it is disgust with Obama, but not all. Altogether an interesting phenomenon. Again the most interesting evidence is in the comments. I am pleased to see Bill Clinton saying Putin keeps his word. I agree after years of observation: he says what he means and means what he says.

IGNORANCE. Not only did Senator McCain think that Pravda would be a suitable place to retort to Putin’s editorial, but he got the wrong Pravda. He’s even more out of touch with reality than previously suspected. A window into the ignorance of the American anti-Russia brigade.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Syrian propaganda war. A week of hysteria – Russia is selling S-300s; they’re here; they’re not here; they’re coming; they’re game-changers. Huge flap (97 million Google hits). What was the evidence for any of it? S-300s date from 1979 (although many improvements) and are not some hitherto unknown super weapon. BTW Syria has lots of Soviet/Russian AD systems and none seems to hamper the Israeli Air Force. In any case Putin has just said no. Like most of the news out of Syria this is misdirection away from something that actually was happening. What would that have been? Assad’s successes (only a year ago he was a goner)? The EU arming the opposition? Ah, this must be what we weren’t supposed to see: the US is deploying its equivalent system in the neighbourhood and may keep it there. And fighter planes too. Well, well, those nasty Russians make useful distractions.

NGOs. The polling company Levada is saying that it is being told to register as a foreign agent under the new law and that it may have to close down. Its director says it receives a trivial amount of its budget – a couple of percentage points – from foreign sources. It is also reported that VTsIOM is hearing similar things. I find this a little fishy. One, who’s telling it? Two, why would it have to close down? Three, take this to court and see what happens and then complain. Four, while Levada is independent (and its boss no fan of Putin), VTsIOM is government-owned; why would the government want to “shut down” both? It’s also worth saying that both come up with similar results – I see no bias in either. As I say, something doesn’t sound right.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Corruption. Well, there sure are a lot of investigations going on and they reaching levels within sight of the top of the power heap: after all Serdyukov was appointed by Putin who stuck by him for years against the resistance of the generals. This blog entry enumerates some of the biggest corruption investigations: it mentions the Defence Ministry property scandal (the new Minister has just fired another official, but probably not for that connection); RosTelekom; a former Agriculture Minister; GLONASS; a big one in St Petersburg and a swindle in Perm Region. Kommersant estimates the total bill at 57 billion rubles (about US$1.8 billion). And maybe more from the Defence Ministry: there are reported to be 60,000 empty apartments for military retirees. A fraud case has opened in Yekaterinburg. Arrests for mistreatment of convicts and perhaps more coming after the prison riot in Chelyabinsk last month. Typically, a lot of Western coverage sticks to its favourite meme – everything in Russia is other than it seems – and tries to paint this as an internal power struggle (ie Serdyukov’s father-in-law). But this is a lot and it’s getting fairly high up. Here’s a website’s list of the “top ten” convicted officials. Russia’s high level of corruption stands in the way of many of the Team’s goals: attracting foreign investment, modernising the economy, improving infrastructure, pinching pennies. Putin’s speech yesterday (“Hold your applause, you may not like what is coming”) called corruption “a threat to national development prospects” and laid out the next level. While we still haven’t seen someone close to him led away to prison (but the investigators aren’t finished with Serdyukov), the tumbrils are in the neighbourhood. It’s will be long campaign and one that is never completed in any country. The best we can hope is that a big bite will be taken out of it.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Corruption. There are those who believe that one of the main reasons for Putin’s re-appearance in the President’s chair was that only he has the political muscle to really move on Russia’s widespread problem of corruption, especially corruption at the top. I have always said that we won’t know that the anti-corruption drive is serious until it takes down someone in an office near Putin’s or Medvedev’s. Do we start to see this? The OboronServis case is getting bigger. The case concerns skulduggery with the extensive number of military properties. Some charges have been laid and the inquiry has been widened.  Last week Putin dismissed Defence Minister Serdyukov (that’s an office pretty near his) and some think that there is a connection and there is a hint in Putin’s words that there is (although, naturally, there are plenty of other theories too). Sergey Shoygu, the popular long-time Emergency Services Minister (Governor of Moscow Region since April) was appointed to replace him. The Chief of the General Staff and other senior military were also replaced shortly after and others today. It’s true that Serdyukov was very unpopular with the generals but Putin had kept him on nevertheless upon his return. Another possible scandal that may emerge involves the defence industries which many accuse of being only able to make ineffective weapons that are also very expensive. On the heels of this comes another scandal in another important and celebrated enterprise: the Russian GPS system GLONASS. For some years it has been promising more than it has delivered and now a case charging embezzlement has been opened. The chief designer of the system has just been fired. These are corruption scandals in important and prestigious parts of the state structure and are therefore much more momentous than another bent cop discovered somewhere in the sticks. More coming maybe. I would observe that, in my opinion, the worst corruption in Russia involves privatisation: public property being transformed into private gain; both of these fit that category.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

NGOs. The new law was overwhelmingly passed by the Duma and the Federation Council. (a real all-party effort – it’s a popular provision: 60% plus). In essence, NGOs that are foreign-funded and operate in the political sphere must report on the extent of foreign funding and label themselves as foreign agents. Here is what has changed. The law is somewhat modelled on the US FARA law of 1938 that “requires persons acting as agents of foreign principals in a political or quasi-political capacity to make periodic public disclosure of their relationship with the foreign principal” (something seldom mentioned in much of the commentary on the Russian law). Much flapdoodle from those whose oxen will be gored and livelihoods will be affected. Application is, of course the key, but I have no problem with the law: I think Canada, which has a similar problem, should have a similar law. People should be able to know what interests are trying to influence them.

State Council. Leaders of the parliamentary opposition have been added to this advisory group which held its first meeting in this new format on Tuesday. Usual response: either an opening to or cooption of.

Internet. The Duma and the Federation Council have passed a law allowing websites “promoting illegal drugs, child abuse or suicide” to be shut down. Not uncommon elsewhere.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Vorstand reshuffle. Putin was inaugurated on Monday and, as promised, immediately nominated Medvedev as PM. He was confirmed by the Duma the next day (Communists and Just Russia voting against). I was intrigued by their first reported actions: Putin ordered the creation of a business ombudsman to defend “the rights of entrepreneurs” showing that improvement of Russia’s business climate is a high priority. Medvedev called for a new system of state defence orders. This last has been notoriously opaque; many complain the money is not wisely spent and Russian-made weapons are over priced and not modern. Note that each of these touches on corruption: there are those who think that Putin returned to the Presidency because only he has the political muscle to attack this pervasive problem. Perhaps so, we will see. I still think that we need to see someone in an office close to the two led away in handcuffs for an anti-corruption drive to really bite.

Foreign policy. Putin quickly issued a host of decrees, one on foreign policy. The first priority is “to assist in creating favourable external conditions for the Russian Federation’s long-term development, modernisation of its economy, and strengthening its positions as an equal partner on global markets.” The second is “to seek to assert the rule of law in international relations, to advocate the leading role of the UN in global affairs and the fundamental principles of the UN Charter that require the development of friendly relations between nations on the basis of equality, respect for each others’ sovereignty and territorial integrity…” This is a country that wants a quiet life so it can develop its economy.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Election. Results here in Russian on the CEC site and in English at RIAN. Putin 63.6%, Zyuganov 17.18%, Prokhorov 7.98%, Zhirinovskiy 6.22% (fourth place for once!), Mironov 3.86%. Turnout 65.3%. Turnout in Moscow City and St Petersburg about 50%. Chechnya was a little more subdued this time: a mere 94.89% turnout with only 99.76% for Putin. Interesting from the point of view of the polls: Putin did better than FOM or VTsIOM predicted but on the low range of Levada’s 63-66%. Zyuganov did better than anyone predicted, beating the average estimate by 20%, and Zhirinovskiy did somewhat worse (but they share a sector of the electorate and their total was very close to the estimate); Prokhorov hit the average prediction but Mironov was significantly worse at only about 65% of the prediction. But, generally speaking not large variations from the predicted results and Putin’s lead over perennial runner-up Zyuganov of three and a half to one is hard to pretend was manufactured. (Which isn’t stopping people from trying with what can only be an intentional misuse of statistics).Turnout was below average but still respectable. I have the feeling that the Western connection of the protestors (and I repeat that the US Ambassador’s meeting with the opposition was a gift) induced some people to vote Putin who might not otherwise (à la Voter 2’s story). Prokhorov may have a future as the non-Communist anti-Putin (a Forbes survey rated him the second-most respected billionaire) (perhaps in the cabinet, Putin suggests). Mironov, however, may not have much of a political future.