Russia: Other Points of View

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Syria et al. Whenever something horrible happens in the world that Western governments and media outlets actually notice, we find two different reactions from Moscow and Washington. Moscow confines itself to anodyne statements about constitutional agreement, peace and so forth – admirable sentiments which do nothing. Washington, on the other hand, feels it has to pick a side and blame those that don’t. US media outlets either create this judgement or follow along (which comes first?). Washington then accuses Moscow (and others) of preventing it “doing something”; the media picks up this line and fills up with stories (many of which don’t prove to be true: this one again, for example). When the crisis ends, interest and coverage do too. The collective memory is wiped clean and attention moves to the next CNN crisis. Since the end of the Cold War I recall four of these “humanitarian interventions” that exemplify this pattern. No one today ever mentions Somalia (1992) or Haiti (1994); the first being an utter disaster and the second ineffective. As to Kosovo (1999) we never heard about the KLA and organ harvesting at the time or much else about the people NATO put into power today; as to Libya (2011) mention of gunmen fighting it out or knock-on effects in Chad or Mali stays far in the back pages. The reality is that these “humanitarian interventions” aren’t such big successes that anyone should lightly proceed to the next one. So, if Putin “lectured” Obama, whose knowledge of the world is a bit shaky, I have some sympathy with him. Their bland joint statement here.

PERESTROIKA 2.0 AND THE MOSCOW SPRING

REPRINTS

This article was originally published by Fair Observer  on May 11, 2012

The fruits of Putinism and the Putin-Medvedev tandem.

As the Russian winter turns to spring, the country has seen a return to opposition politics, political competition, and dissent within the corridors of power, and the election of a more opposition-minded parliament and an all-too-familiar president. Regardless of what US mainstream media and academia have told you, the liberalization and re-democratization of the winter-spring transition from the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev to that of Vladimir Putin are nothing new. December’s watershed events were the logical outcome of a four-year-long process that marks Russia’s return to democratization and market reforms and perhaps a longer-term transition without revolutionary excesses preferred by Putin.

The pro-Kremlin United Russia party’s poor showing in December’s Duma elections, along with the mass demonstrations for free and fair elections and the re-democratization proposals introduced by Medvedev in their aftermath, should not have been a surprise. Sovietological groupthink made Mikhail Gorbachev, perestroika 1.0, Boris Yeltsin’s revolution from above, and that revolution’s failure to quickly bring democracy surprising, and russological groupthink has left us unprepared for Medvedev’s long-denied thaw and Perestroika 2.0. The new Moscow spring and Perestroika 2.0 are real and need to be properly understood by presidential candidates and policymakers alike.

RIGGED RUSSIAN ELECTION?

by Martin Hellman

Given how our media have covered Russia’s March 4 presidential election, it is understandable that many Americans believe Vladimir Putin stole the presidency. The reality, however, is very different. From all the reading I have done, it appears that there was some electoral fraud, but that Putin would have won by a significant margin in any event. Aside from being wrong, the disconnect between American perception and Russian reality adds a needless component to the risk of a nuclear confrontation.

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RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Demonstrations. The opposition movement is losing steam. As we have seen before in post-Soviet Russia, it is one thing to agree on dislike of the present regime but quite another to agree on what comes next. An association of former ins wanting to get back in, communists, nationalists and “new young people” do not have very much in common. The two pre-eminent leaders (or actors: are there any “leaders”?) now appear to be the hard left Sergey Udaltsov and the anti-corruption (and rather nationalistic) Aleksey Navalniy. They agree on their dislike of Putin &Co and people from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Is that enough to make a match? Perhaps, nationalism and socialism have co-existed before. Meanwhile the anti-Putin demos are getting smaller and, in some cases we see a return to the provocative demos (ie no permit or breaking the permit) that characterised opposition protests in the Luzhkov days. Western reporters breathlessly write these up and diplomats huff but, really, now that it is clear that protesters can assemble in the tens of thousands so long as they do what they apply to do, what is the point of provocative demos? Udaltsov is calling for “a march of millions” for the day before Putin’s swearing in but it seems very unlikely that anything like that will turn out. It’s over for the moment: a VTsIOM poll indicates interest is waning. And, the basic premise that the Duma elections were stolen has still not produced any convincing evidence. And even less so in the case of Putin’s victory. Amusingly, some media people have set up a mock Facebook group “Journalists Against Demonstrations”. Presumably if they hold a “Demo against Demos” they won’t cover it.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Election. Results here in Russian on the CEC site and in English at RIAN. Putin 63.6%, Zyuganov 17.18%, Prokhorov 7.98%, Zhirinovskiy 6.22% (fourth place for once!), Mironov 3.86%. Turnout 65.3%. Turnout in Moscow City and St Petersburg about 50%. Chechnya was a little more subdued this time: a mere 94.89% turnout with only 99.76% for Putin. Interesting from the point of view of the polls: Putin did better than FOM or VTsIOM predicted but on the low range of Levada’s 63-66%. Zyuganov did better than anyone predicted, beating the average estimate by 20%, and Zhirinovskiy did somewhat worse (but they share a sector of the electorate and their total was very close to the estimate); Prokhorov hit the average prediction but Mironov was significantly worse at only about 65% of the prediction. But, generally speaking not large variations from the predicted results and Putin’s lead over perennial runner-up Zyuganov of three and a half to one is hard to pretend was manufactured. (Which isn’t stopping people from trying with what can only be an intentional misuse of statistics).Turnout was below average but still respectable. I have the feeling that the Western connection of the protestors (and I repeat that the US Ambassador’s meeting with the opposition was a gift) induced some people to vote Putin who might not otherwise (à la Voter 2’s story). Prokhorov may have a future as the non-Communist anti-Putin (a Forbes survey rated him the second-most respected billionaire) (perhaps in the cabinet, Putin suggests). Mironov, however, may not have much of a political future.

RUSSIA WEEK: DEJA - BOOM, OR DEJA-BUST?

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

by Chris Weafer

This is a holiday-shortened week in Russia due to the March 8 International Women’s Day holiday. Friday is also a holiday, having been swapped with next Sunday to extend the March 8 break. The ADR/GDR markets will remain open for normal trade. 

The four most dangerous words in investing are “This time it’s different”, Sir John Templeton

Putin delivers clear-cut victory. Vladimir Putin’s victory with a projected 64% of the vote is not far off that forecast by various opinion polls over recent weeks. This should help draw a line under the protest movement in its current form, which should be greeted with relief by investors. But the outcome is mostly priced in already, and, as expected, after a short relief bounce there is no significant impact on equities this morning. Weaker trade across Asian markets as a result of China guiding lower economic growth this year will have more of an impact. Attention will quickly switch to who will be appointed to the key positions in the next government and how Putin can deliver on promises made during his election campaign without busting the budget or further raising the economy’s dependency on the oil price. 

Too far, too fast. Notwithstanding the election outcome, external rather than domestic events are more likely to drive market performance this week. The prevailing mood last week was that markets have all run too far, too fast over the past two months and now need a period of consolidation to allow the anticipated good economic news to be validated. Investors in Russia have almost fully priced in the Putin victory, though there some caution will persist until the risk of post-election clashes passes. We are, however, unlikely to see any repeat of 1H08 euphoria that resulted from a rising oil price and the inauguration of President Dmitry Medvedev. The memory of what happened over the second half of that year will ensure that caution remains until Putin’s next government starts to show results rather than promises. 

The full note can be viewed Download Russia_Week_Mar_5

RUSSIA'S OLIGARCHS

REPRINTS

Putin's oligarch killer

Asia Times, Mar 2, 2012

By John Helmer

MOSCOW - When the archaeologists of the next millennium excavate, they will find the evidence of a tectonic shift and turning-point in Russian history that took place in the two months between December 28 and February 25.

That's from the day Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed government order number VP-P13-9308, and instructed Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin to supervise compliance; to the day when lawyer and prominent blogger Alexei Navalny listed the most powerful oligarchs in the country (Switzerland too) as the target of the political opposition - after Putin wins the presidential election.

Navalny's speech at last Saturday's St Petersburg rally marks the first time the oligarch system, and the oligarchs as individuals rather than Putin, have been made the public focus of the opposition movements. Navalny himself named the lines of business to identify the individuals, though he didn't name names.

Putin's order predates Navalny's, and it has taken time for the political opposition to understand it - if implemented, it marks the beginning of the end of the oligarch system that has dominated Russia since the collapse of the communist system. Just how significant this is may not require a glacial span of time to uncover. But if it is happening, Putin has already beaten the opposition to their own game. That is, if opposition to the oligarchs was the opposition's game.

READING THE RUSSIAN ELECTION

REPRINTS

by Anatoly Karlin, Al- Jazeera, March 4, 2012

Berkeley, CA - If the tropes peddled by the Western media are to be believed, the Kremlin is faced with unprecedented challenges, from plummeting popularity to grassroots middle-class revolt. A "Russian Spring" is in the air, with Putin on the verge of being swept away by the same upswell of Twittering youth that unseated his Arab counterparts Ben Ali and Mubarak (provided, of course, that he doesn’t imitate Assad by shelling his own people).

Maybe it’s a new perestroika. Or perhaps the right comparison is to the US civil rights movement, with the Russian middle class providing the moral clarity and drive that will inexorably undermine and topple Putinism.

Videos warn Russia of life without Putin

Overwhelmingly, commentary on the forthcoming presidential elections is filtered through the above narrative prisms. This is unsurprising, because a classical standoff between Repression and Liberty is both easily comprehensible, and ties in neatly with today's - if, perhaps, not tomorrow’s - fashionable "springtime of peoples" narrative used to explain the Arab revolts. But forcing Russian politics onto this Procrustean bed distorts far more than it elucidates, because at its heart it is based on flawed - in many cases, I daresay mythical - foundations.

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TOMORROW'S NEWS TODAY

by Patrick Armstrong

This video is entitled “Falsifications in the Election of the President of Russia 4 March.”  

It shows several scenes: voting with a false identity, a local election committee interrupted as it is creating results in a back room and instructions given to a team of multiple voters. The film part isn’t much of anything: shots of hands, floors and someone in a van – all giving that atmosphere of handheld verisimilitude – but the sound is suspiciously good. The whole thing could have been knocked together in a couple of hours.

One fact, two suppositions and one conclusion.

The fact of course is that the video is a fraud: it’s not 4 March yet and the voting hasn’t started.

But whose fraud is it?

One can imagine that some of the pro-Putin people could have put this thing together so as to discredit in advance the kinds of videos that we saw after December’s Duma vote. 

But one can also imagine that Russia’s not inefficient signals intelligence organisation has discovered a fraud video being created and stockpiled in advance by the antis.

There are big stakes in this election and a lot of people inside and outside Russia would like to discredit Putin.

The conclusion is that the discrediting apparatus of the “coloured revolution” package: exit polls (done by whom, over what time and how representative?), blurry videos and anecdotes are easily contrived. Opinion polls are real; contradicting their predictive power requires much more robust evidence than these easily-manufactured trifles.

An investigation into the authors has been opened but we probably won’t find out anything for months, if ever.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

ELECTION. The last polls are published and it’s clear Putin will win on the first round. VTsIOM. FOM and Levada all agree and their numbers average out at: Putin 60-61%; Zyuganov 15%; Zhirinovskiy 8-9%; Prokhorov 7-8% and Mironov 6%. As always, any significant variation from these numbers will be cause for suspicion. I reiterate that when the final results – as the Duma ones did – correspond to long series of opinions polls from different sources then the burden of proof is on those that say the results were cooked. Really robust evidence is needed to counter the appearance of the expected. This fact ought to be apparent to the meanest intellect but for some reason is no t. I expect the customary incompetent and biased reporting from the Western media. Once again, the runners-up will not be the “liberals” so lionised by Western observers but the Communist and Zhirinovskiy nominees. The rest – however many there may be – compete for 10% to 15%. But that truth – an immutable law of Russian elections since 1991 – seems to be unable to be grasped by so many outside observers who really think that the inclusion of, say, Yavlinskiy would make some difference. Not to Putin’s vote, not to Zyuganov’s vote and not to Zhirinovskiy’s vote. Only to the runners-up in the swamp who would have had to share their small piece of the electoral pie with another. I reiterate that I believe Putin’s decision to stand as President again is a mistake, but the majority of Russians are happy enough with it. 59-61% is, of course a drop from his former results in the high 60s but that is only natural. Most Western politicians would love to get that much. Maybe things would be different if the Communists had refreshed their leadership or if Yavlinskiy ten or fifteen years ago had been willing to share the spotlight but that didn’t happen. The number to watch I think is turnout; I expect it to be down from previous presidential elections (1991-2008), but how much? Normally in the high 60s, the lowest was Putin’s second at 64.3%.