Russia: Other Points of View

MOSCOW––ANDREI KORTUNOV, RIAC

On June 2, 2015 we 20 American travelers split into groups of four and traveled by metros or taxis with student guides to different parts of Moscow.  Our videographer Mel Van Dusen, Merlin Miller, organizer of a new political party from Tennessee, Charles Heberle, retired military who worked at the Pentagon and NATO and I went to see an old acquaintance with whom I'd kept up for over 30 years. 

Back in 1984 a group of us got an appointment to Moscow's  U.S.-Canada Institute, a prestigious 'think tank' that was considered the most liberal in the Soviet Union. To our surprise a quite young, blonde-haired young man introduced himself as Andrei Kortunov. He was decades younger than others in this respected institute.  Obviously bright and comfortable in his position, he seemed warmly predisposed to all things American unlike others we had met. Andrei was clearly interested in discussing issues off and on with citizen diplomats from the U.S.  During the Gorbachev and Yeltsin years I watched his career take him to positions of responsibility wherein he remained the same logical, open, helpful personality he exhibited from the beginning. 

Today Andrei is the Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the President of the New Eurasia Foundation (FNE). He is still down to earth, modest and as hesitant-to-be-sharp as was the fair-haired young man we met at around age 20. One thing noted this time, he seems weary from dealing with the heavy issues of his position––yet is as always the consummate gentleman.  Mel pushed him with questions that finally brought out his feelings on a number of issues related to the US-Russia relationship.

Soft Power: Russian Foreign Policy

Friends, increasingly American experts like Carnegie's David Speedie are speaking out in more moderate voices regarding Russia's behaviors and intentions on the international scene -- this is welcome relief after the heyday of half truths, groundless accusations and ill will generated recently by American mainstream media. May their numbers multiply.  I can certainly verify that one gets this sense from Russian people throughout the regions we visited in June. They were amazingly non-hostile when discussing US-Russia relations given that their purchasing power has been halved by the sanctions. They have a growing sense of themselves, their history and culture …. and Russia's ability to survive and eventually thrive within a milieu of classical norms.  Sharon 

 

"Soft Power": The Values that Shape Russian Foreign Policy

DAVID C. SPEEDIE  |  U.S. Global Engagement  |  JULY 30, 2015

This article is in anticipation of an upcoming Carnegie Council project on Russian "soft power" and values that shape foreign policy.

In the increasingly frigid environment of U.S.-Russia relations, much attention is given to what may be seen as Russia's strategic "interests." (Of course, much of the policymaking class in the West seems to suggest that Russia is entitled to no "interests" whatsoever.) Of at least equal significance for understanding Russian attitudes, however, is a grasp of the values, the moral framework for Russia's foreign policy.

A valuable resource for this understanding is found in a recent article, "Russia's Orthodox Soft Power," by the University of Rhode Island scholar Nicolai Petro, who explores the "symphonic relationship" between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state and the manner in which they both utilize the term Russky mir, or Russian World. For the discussion herein of what this entails, we are indebted to Professor Petro.

As Petro observes, the term Russky mir has been wrongly interpreted by some Western analysts as the "perverse intersection" between the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church; in reality, the term is employed differently by each party. Where the state uses it as a tool for expanding Russia's cultural and political influence, the Church views it as a spiritual concept linked to God's objective for the rebuilding of a Holy Rus. The relationship between the two provides a popular and definable framework for Russian foreign policy. Values play a significant role in policy formulation and, throughout modern history, three constants dictate how Russia responds to Western actions: sovereignty, capability to defend that sovereignty, and loyalty to those who share Russia's sense of honor. (The 2014 conflict Ukraine exacerbated the perceived values gap between the West and Russia, yet Russia claims it occupies the higher moral ground by defending its core values of honor in the context of the unique historical, religious, and cultural bonds with Ukraine.)

In summary: The significance of religion in Russian life allows the state to garner huge social capital from having the blessing of the Orthodox Church, and likewise the Church benefits from the relationship by disseminating its message of Christianity worldwide via Russian foreign policy. For the state, Russky Mir is a political/cultural tool for strengthening domestic stability, worldwide status, and influence in neighboring states. For the Church, it is a religious foundation essential for reversing the secularization of society (which it sees as an unwelcome evolution already well underway in the West).

The Dangers of a Declining Global Power

Friends, at last credible voices are speaking out about the primary cause behind Washington's incessant drive to take Russia down––or out.

Sadly,  our great America is in decline -- slowly but surely.  Russia (and China) definitely are on the incline.  Just having come from four different regions in Russia, it is clear that the latter  is a country whose momentum is upward and they are moving at a fast clip.  China, is even more so, I'm told.  So why is it that Russia is Washington's  #1 target? 

Perhaps it is that for some 130 years American administrations have been trying to out-compete Russia, including the 50 years of US-USSR confrontation during which we were in a duel to death with 50,000 nuclear missiles (on launch pads and ready to fire) between us.  We didn't have that personal history with China.  But with Russia and her ill-gotten Republics, it was a very personal vendetta.  And now in the 2000s to see Russia coming up in the world and ourselves in decline –– this must be a deafening blow to those elder white males whose power still runs America today. It becomes clear why the demonization of Russia and Putin have been so intense, so intractable––perhaps thinking that taking them out or down would solve our decline problems?

INSIDE PUTIN’S HEAD: The Crisis in Russia and Ukraine and Worst-Case Putin Scenarios

by Gordon Hahn

www.gordonhahn.com

Introduction

The present Russian-NATO proxy war in Ukraine along with the Russian-Western economic cold war could destabilize Russia’s political metastability and even topple Putin and his system. Assume for a moment that Putin really is pushed into a corner. Imagine Putin’s foreign reserves begin to run out cutting into his popularity, and/or he loses his battle with the West over Ukraine because of Russia’s economic weaknesses in conditions of falling oil and natural gas prices and Western sanctions. Political and economic crises mount, and the foundations of his system begin to shake. Putin the winner has become Putin the disappointing loser.

The regime elite begins to split; some defect to the opposition. The latter begins to mount successively larger and more turbulent demonstrations led by a Maidan-like mix of democrats, angered by economic dislocation, and ultra-nationalists, disgruntled by a failure to annex or protect the Donbass. All this reaches a crescendo – a perfect storm – in the runup to, during or just after the 2018 presidential election. It is around elections when corrupt authoritarian systems are often challenged because of limited levels of public trust in the electoral process. The emperor has no clothes.

In such a situation how would Putin and his political order likely react? What would his options be and which among them would he most likely choose? In short, what would Putin try to do to salvage his rule?

Although Putin is not an ultra-nationalist dictator or would-be imperialist, he is likely to err on the side of increasingly authoritarian and expansionist measures to protect his power and system, which he regards as necessary to achieve the growth of Russian power. Russian President Vladimir Putin is determined to maintain Russian influence in Ukraine. Therefore, if pushed into a corner in Ukraine, internationally, or at home, Putin is likely to crackdown on domestic opposition and foreign economic and political elements inside Russia and undertake high-risk foreign policy measures like the Crimea annexation in order to save face. If Putin overreaches, the West overreacts, or a ‘black swan’ event occurs at such a pivot point, war with the West – perhaps a second Crimean war – would be at hand.

Continue reading 

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

RUSSIA HAS HAD ENOUGH. I agree, as I usually do, with Alexander Mercouris: here and here he argues that Putin and his team have given up trying for a diplomatic solution. Moscow used its influence to stop the rebels' offensive last year when they believed themselves on the edge of routing the Kiev forces, forced the Minsk ceasefire, made several proposals to Kiev and... nothing. I believe that Putin stopped believing anything the West said after Libya, but I think he kept hoping Europe would not be willing to harm itself in subjugation to Washington. Or maybe he just needed time; time to strengthen links with the BRICS and especially Beijing, time to de-dollarise (Russia is buying a lot of gold), time to build up and exercise the military; time to make his case to the “not-the-world” (I love this cartoon). I'm sure he has the next move figured out and I'm equally sure Brussels, Washington and their dependants will be just as stunned by it as they were the last times.

RUSSIAN ECONOMY. Two takes on it that argue that the situation is serious but recoverable: Goldman Sachs repeats points I have mentioned; Chris Weafer says rally but not boom. Yes, inflation is up, yes the Ruble is down, but there is much import substitute going on, industrial and agricultural production continue to rise and unemployment is unchanged. As for rating downgrades, China has a different opinion. Time, as they say, will tell. But I'd bet on China.

DEMOGRAPHICS. Excellent summary by Anatoly Karlin. By the way, Russia now has a higher crude birth rate than anywhere in Europe.

GAS. After welcoming the decision to stop South Stream, the Europeans are starting to realise that they had better build some infrastructure to pick up Russian gas. Nordstream too. Or do without. Or find another supplier. Or something. They've got about four years. Here's the new reality.

FIGHTING. Putin made a last appeal for both sides to withdraw following the Minsk agreements but Kiev attacked. The “cyborgs” were driven out of the airport (your local media outlets took a week or so to tell you: here's The Guardian saying the Kiev forces had re-taken the airport. They didn't; cancel your subscription.) Another “cauldron” is forming and the neo-nazis are saying all is lost. What's their answer: coup or götterdämmerung?

HOW TO READ THE WESTERN MEDIA. When they say Kiev forces have re-taken the airport, know that they have lost it. When they say giving up South Stream was a defeat for Putin, know it was a brilliant counter-move. When they say Russia is isolated (a stopped clock, here's The Economist in 1999!), know that it is expanding its influence and connections every day. When they say Russians are turning against Putin, know that the opposite is true. When they speak of nation-building in the new Ukraine, know it's degenerating into armed thuggery (see video). Know that when they speak of Kyrzbekistan, they're not just stenographers, they're incompetent stenographers. Take what they say, turn it upside down, and you'll have a better take on reality.

THE MERKEL MYSTERY. I, like many, thought, when the Ukraine crisis began, that German Chancellor Merkel would prove to be key in settling it. This has not proved to be the case at all; in fact she often throws more fuel on the fire. I believe that Gilbert Doctorow may have the answer. In essence, he believes that Berlin dreams the “pre-WWI dream of Mitteleuropa” with cheap, docile workers in Poland, Ukraine and the others forever. Of course, it hasn't worked out very well, but that, he thinks, was the plan. There was no “End of History” after all; a rebirth of history it seems.

THE WHEELS ARE COMING OFF THE BUS. A US official expressed concern that Russia and China were narrowing the military-technology gap. Threaten them and they come together; nothing is working out the way it was supposed to, is it? Do people in Washington ever wonder if they're trying to juggle too many balls at once? And now Greece is throwing grit in the machinery.

DECLARATION OF WAR? The Ukrainian parliament just declared that Russia was an “aggressor state”. Is that a declaration of war? Can Russia now legally go in and stop the killing?

UKRAINE TODAY. Watch this video – your media outlets hide the insanity from you. But we don't.

© Patrick Armstrong Analysis, Ottawa, Canada Websites: ROPV, US-Russia, Russia Insider

WHEN NO MEANS YES: HOW MOSCOW LEARNED TO LOVE NATO EXPANSION AND ITS BORDERS

By Gordon M. Hahn

Ever since the idea of expanding NATO without Russia was first broached in the early 1990s, many policymakers and analysts have argued that Russia does not view NATO expansion as a threat but rather uses it as a pretext to interfere in the domestic politics or attempt to restore its lost empire. This is a false and dangerous myth that is intended to remove the share of responsibility the West bears for the growing conflict with Russia. This myth risks yet more conflict to the detriment of the West, Russia, and its neighbors.

Those who purvey the myth that Moscow really is not opposed to, or concerned about a NATO expansion that excludes Russia do so in the face of the facts. Indeed, every late Soviet and post-Soviet Russian president and foreign minister has rejected NATO expansion precisely because it is detrimental to Russian national security. Russia’s military doctrine puts at the top of the list of “external military dangers…the growing violent potential of NATO and the delegation to it of global functions which are facilitative of violations of international law and the nearing of the military infrastructure of the member-countries of NATO to the borders of the Russian Federation, in particular by way of the bloc’s further expansion.” Trial balloons and direct proposals floated by every post-Soviet Russian president about Russia joining NATO were received coldly or completely ignored. Putin publicly supported the possibility during his first months in office and received no response.

Gorbachev's Full Speech in Germany Nov 8, 2014

Gorbachev's full speech during the celebrations of the 25th Anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Each paragraph to the end is loaded with honesty and policy experience.  Sharon

The Huffington Post

November 8, 2014

My Appeal to Our Leaders and to All of Us: Let Us Think, Propose and Act Together

By Mikhail Gorbachev

Former President of Soviet Union, Nobel Laureate

The following speech was delivered on November 8, 2014 at the New Policy Forum symposium in Berlin. 

I am pleased to welcome all the participants and to see among them both the veterans of our Forum and some new faces. I expect all of them to make a contribution to serious and constructive dialogue which is so necessary now.

Our conference is being held simultaneously with the celebrations of the 25th anniversary of the fall of the wall that divided Germany and Europe. I would like first of all to congratulate the Germans, and all of us, on the anniversary of this truly historic event. 

Historic shifts that seem unexpected to contemporaries may later appear inevitable, preordained. But let us recall the time when it was all happening and how tumultuous and urgent the process of change was. Its outcome -- the peaceful unification of Germany -- was possible only because it had been prepared by great changes in international politics and in the minds of people. 

Lavrov Speaks Truth to Power at the United Nations

Friends, the ever-patient, slow to respond negatively, Sergei Lavrov, Russia's seasoned diplomat and Foreign Minister, spoke out at the United Nations a few days ago in a way he never has done before.  Most likely deeply worried about "what's next"––perhaps a second wave of West Ukrainian devastation of Southeastern Ukraine is in store, he is speaking out in advance.  At the end, he calls on Washington to sign on to the agreement Washington required of the USSR in 1933 -- to avoid Washington from supporting and barreling into a confrontation in Ukraine that could bring about WWIII. 

We in America are so occupied with our own local problems that we are paying no attention to the calamitous possibilities on our international horizon today. What's needed is for millions of American citizens to rise up out of the heartland and telephone or email (Google - how can I get my congress members'  teles/emails?)  our Congress members in mass that we don't approve of any more proxy wars, no more destabilizing of other elected governments, no more demonizing of other leaders and countries, and to stop using US military might to intervene all across the globe.  All of the countries we invaded in the past dozen years are worse off now than before we put boots and weapons on their soils. 

The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry

Dear friends,

I've held off posting reports hoping there might be some slightly positive turns in the US/Ukraine/Russia/EU theatre, but so far the situation seems to be deepening. Unfortunately serious reporting in mainstream media has practically come to a standstill. Iraq has certainly become a convenient smokescreen––with a near blackout on the slaughter in East Ukraine.  Our Russian Rotarians are involved in refugee support as the floods of East  Ukrainians (last number I saw was 110,000) flood into Rostov, Voronezh and Belgorod regions. 

Trenin is a widely acknowledged expert on US/Russia relations. His "big picture" analyses are important to understand the larger dynamic in which these global players: the U.S.,Russia and Europe, operate. The article below is the recent history as seen from afar––and possible prognosis from afar. He barely touches on the active role of the U.S. in these Ukraine events or the slaughter going on in Eastern Ukraine, but does give a long-term perspective on what may the result be.

 

Carnegie Moscow Center

July 9, 2014

The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry [excerpt]

By Dmitri Trenin

Director Moscow Center

[Complete text here http://carnegie.ru/2014/07/09/ukraine-crisis-and-resumption-of-great-power-rivalry/hfgs] 

Summary 

The Ukraine crisis has brought an end to the post-Cold War status quo in Europe. Russia has stepped forward to protect its vital interests-which the West saw as aggression by a revisionist power. The ensuing conflict will last long and have an impact far beyond Europe. 

The Ukraine crisis that erupted in early 2014 has brought an end to the post-Cold War status quo in Europe. Russia, feeling betrayed by its Western partners because of their support for regime change in Kiev, has stepped forward to protect its vital interests-which the West saw as aggression by a revisionist power. The ensuing conflict will last long and have an impact far beyond Europe. 

A TORTURED POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA

REPRINTS

By Ian Bremmer

New York Times

THE United States has once again twisted itself into a rhetorical pretzel. As when it threatened military action against Syria if a “red line” was crossed, the Obama administration’s rhetoric about Russia and Ukraine goes far beyond what it will be willing and able to enforce.

Earlier this month, President Obama warned that America would “isolate Russia” if it grabbed more land, and yesterday, he suggested that more sanctions were possible. Likewise, Secretary of State John Kerry said the Group of 7 nations were “prepared to go to the hilt” in order to isolate Russia.

But Washington’s rhetoric is dangerously excessive, for three main reasons: Ukraine is far more important to Vladimir V. Putin than it is to America; it will be hard for the United States and Europe to make good on their threats of crippling sanctions; and other countries could ultimately defang them.

First, the United States needs to see the Ukraine crisis from Russia’s viewpoint. Threats from America and Europe will never be the determining factor in Mr. Putin’s decision making. Ukraine is Russia’s single biggest national security issue beyond its borders, and Mr. Putin’s policy, including whether to seize more of Ukraine, will be informed overwhelmingly by national security interests, not near-term economics.