by Patrick Armstrong
ISSUE: Manas Airbase. In
2001 the USA leased part of the Manas airfield in the Kyrgyz Republic to
support US and Allied operations in Afghanistan. This month, President Bakiyev
announced that he would seek to close the base. The Kyrgyz Republic Parliament
will discuss the issue on 19 February.
INTERPRETATION: Many in the West saw Bakiyev as a puppet and the closure being
orchestrated in Moscow so as to embarrass President Obama. “Bakiyev Pleases Moscow”
(Jamestown
Foundation) “Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has been trying to reclaim the
influence it once had in the former Central Asian Soviet republics, so Russian
pressure on Kyrgyzstan is not unexpected.” (BBC) “"I
think that the principal motivation is to reassert Russian influence and get
visible U.S. presence out of former Soviet republics," said retired Adm.
William J. Fallon” (Huffington
Post) “Russia Offers Kind Words, but Its Fist Is Clenched” (NYT).
Most of these accounts mention Bakiyev’s objections but seem to regard them as
a cover for Russian machinations.
COMMENT: But
Bakiyev has long been frustrated with the relationship with Washington. “The president said he
had repeatedly suggested that the US side should review the airbase agreement
and raise the leasing fee for the airbase, but the suggestion was ignored. He
added that the base closure was also caused by violations of law by US military
personnel, including the killing of a Kyrgyz national by a US soldier in
December 2006.”
There are other reasons why the issue has become a significant challenge:
- The possibility that US forces might
use the base to attack Iran or gather intelligence on China.
- The lack of the “trickle-down”
benefits that may have been expected.
- Concerns over the initial, possibly
corrupt, agreement with the former President of the Kyrgyz Republic.
- Growing scepticism about the
effectiveness and length of the Afghanistan operation.
- The conviction that Washington regards
the Kyrgyz Republic as a third-rate country to be taken for granted. Media
treatments that assume Bakiyev is Moscow’s puppet will not help this
impression.
CONCLUSION:
To regard Bakiyev’s decision (which may yet be reversed) as something planned
in Moscow is to grossly oversimplify the issue and make the common error of
singling out Moscow as the only party to the decision.
FURTHER READING: John
CK Daly: “The Manas Disillusionment”.
Photo source: www.defendamerica.mil
Note that in the new agreement (http://uk.news.yahoo.com/18/20090623/twl-kyrgyzstan-allows-us-to-keep-using-b-2802f3e.html) Bishkek appears to have got most of what it wanted:
1. A lot more money, not just three times as much for the annual rent but another $100 million for other programs.
2. The promise that the base "will be used for the transport of non-military goods of a commercial nature, including construction materials, medicine, fuel, water and clothing"; in short, nothing to do with Iran or China.
So, Bishkek has effectively negotiated an improvement from its point of view.
Posted by: Patrick Armstrong | June 24, 2009 at 08:01 AM